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REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
DAVID H. M ANS*
Adverse Possession
In Gregg v. Moore1 the court rejected a claim of adverse posses-
sion made by the purchaser at a void tax sale against the holders of
the record title. Apparently in the belief that an aunt of a deceased
owner through whom the plaintiffs' title was derived had a life estate
in the lot and dwelling in question, plaintiffs' predecessors in title
had acquiesced in the aunt's occupancy of the premises and appro-
priation of the rents therefrom for a period from 1921 until her death
in 1949. In 1932 the property was conveyed to defendant pursuant
to a tax sale conceded to be void. After the death of the aunt plain-
tiffs acquired title to the property and brought this action to recover
possession from the defendant, who set up the defense of adverse
possession. The decision of the Referee and the circuit judge that de-
fendant had acquired title by adverse possession was reversed by the
Supreme Court, and the plaintiff held entitled to a return of the
property and an accounting for the rents since 1949.
The court found that after the tax sale to the defendant the aunt
continued in possession of the property until her death in 1949, less
than 10 years prior to the commencement of plaintiffs' action, and
until that time there was no change in possession which would bring
home to the owners of the property notice of the fact that defendant
was asserting title thereto. Defendant never notified the owners of
his claim of title, said the court, and under the facts in the case (a
family relationship and an arrangement prior to the tax sale whereby
defendant paid the taxes on the property), the mere fact that after
the tax sale the defendant returned the property in his name and
paid the taxes thereon was insufficient to charge the owners with
notice of his adverse claim.
The burden was on [defendant] to show that the entry was a
hostile one, and this he has not done. If his entry was not hos-
tile, adverse possession could not be said to have begun until
notice thereof was brought home to the true owner, which was
in 1949 after the death of [the aunt].
°Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 85 S.E. 2d 279 (S.C. 1955).
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Construction of Limitations
In Furman University v. Glover2 the court considered the effect of
the following clause in two deeds of land to the State Convention of
the Baptist Denomination in South Carolina (a corporation) :
*. . in trust for and to the use of The Furman University for
educational purposes connected with the said The Furman Uni-
versity, and for no other purpose whatsoever. That is to say,
that the State Convention of the Baptist Denomination in South
Carolina shall henceforth and forever permit and suffer the said
The Furman University to hold, possess and enjoy the said
tract or parcel of land as a site and location for all colleges, aca-
demies, schoolhouses, professors' houses or other buildings or
matters of any kind whatsoever necessary for or connected with
the educational purposes of the said The Furman UniversityP
The conveyances had been made in 1851 and 1852 for the then full
value of the lands. The University asked for a declaratory judgment
that it is vested with an indefeasible fee simple title, with full power
to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the lands. In accordance with
an earlier construction of one of the deeds,4 the court held the lan-
guage in question "was merely declaratory of the purpose, that the
conveyance did not contain any condition subsequent, or reserve any
right or interest whatsoever [in the grantor], that the grantor intend-
ed to divest himself fully of the title, that the Baptist Convention held
a dry or naked trust, and that the statute of uses operated to convey
the fee to Furman University".
A third conveyance made by the same grantor to the Trustees of
the Greenville Academy was likewise declared to reserve no interest
in the grantor. Other than deciding that the original grantor had no
interest therein, the court refused to determine whether or not a sub-
sequent conveyance by the Academy Trustees to Furman University
was made subject to a trust. This was because certain interested
persons were not parties to the present action.
Nash v. Gardner5 presents a number of interesting construction of
limitations problems. However, since the case primarily is con-
cerned with the proper disposition of a lapsed devise, it is omitted
from this property review, and is treated in all aspects by Professor
Karesh in his review of Wills.
2. 226 S.C. 1, 83 S.E. 2d 559 (1954).
3. Furman University v. Glover, supra at 4.
4. McManaway v. Clapp, 150 S.C. 249, 148 S.E. 18 (1929).
5. 226 S.C. 165, 84 S.E. 2d 375 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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Description of Land
In Richardson v. Register6 the court was confronted with the prob-
lem of a latent ambiguity in the description contained in a deed of land.
Plaintiff owned a tract which had been conveyed to him by a deed
describing the tract only as 43.8 acres bounded by lands of A, B,
C, and D, without giving courses and distances. However, the de-
scription did refer to a plat "which plat is made a part of this descrip-
tion," and also identified the land as "the same tract which was owned
by, [AJJ]." At the time of the sale and conveyance to plaintiff the
southeast corner of the tract was in doubt, and plaintiff agreed with
an agent of the owners of the land to the south that on the plat being
made for plaintiff (the plat referred to in the deed), the boundary
would be located as the agent thought it to be, subject to relocation
if such boundary was later found to be incorrect. Defendant sub-
sequently purchasing this land to the south, plaintiff sued to deter-
mine the boundary between the tracts.
Affirming judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, the court found the
description in plaintiff's deed to contain a latent ambiguity (the
identification of the land as "the same tract which was owned by
[AJJ]" was by a preponderance of the evidence at variance with the
location of the southeast boundary on the plat), and extrinsic evi-
dence to establish the disputed boundary, therefore, was admissible.
The court recognized "that where the dividing line between two co-
terminous owners is doubtful and to establish it they meet together
and agree on a line the agreed line must be regarded in all future
controversies to be the true line." However, this principle was
found to be inapplicable since the testimony was to the effect that
the parties contemplated a readjustment of the line should the one
designated on the plat later prove to be erroneous.
In Plummer v. Pluniner7 the court was concerned with the proper
construction of a devise ". . . to my sons, A and B, thetract of land
known as the home place, consisting of 63 acres, more or less, share
and share alike, which shares I have determined and have by deeds
conveyed each share to them." A survey made after the testator's
death disclosed the tract to contain 70 38/100 acres. In a previous
action for partition by A against B, in which there had been no ap-
peal, it had been decreed that two deeds executed by the testator to
A and B individually, but which were ineffectual as conveyances
6. 87 S.E. 2d 40 (S.C. 1955).
7. 226 S.C. 344, 85 S.E. 2d 189 (1954).
19551
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because of nondelivery, were to be construed as a part of the will.8
Descriptions in these deeds made it clear that the testator intended
B to receive the northern half of the tract and A the southern half,
each deed purporting to convey 32 acres, more or less. Preambles in
the deeds recited that the testator was conveying "my lands .. .to
my children and heirs, in the acreage and description that I intend
each heir or child shall receive." Subsequent to the first action the
present one was brought to determine the boundary line between the
parties. Division into two tracts of equal acreage would result in
B having acreage of greater value, and A contended that the division
should be by value rather than by acreage.
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit judge that the division
should be by acreage rather than by value. Earlier South Carolina
authority9 to the effect that a devise of a tract of land to two persons
"to be equally divided between them" contemplates equality of value
and not equality of acreage was recognized. However, even assum-
ing the language here used by the testator, i. e., "share and share
alike," to be equivalent, the court held such earlier authority to be in-
applicable because of additional language used by the testator. The
first action determined that the ineffective deeds were to be con-
strued as part of the devise. Descriptions in these deeds showed
an intention to give the sons equal acreage (32 acres each - what
was thought to be one-half of the tract), and the deeds recited an in-
tention to convey "in the acreage ... that I intend each child
shall receive." (emphasis by the court).
Dower
In Shelton v. Shelton'0 the South Carolina court aligned itself
with the great weight of authority in holding a wife not to be en-
titled on account of her inchoate right of dower to have any portion
of an award to her husband upon a condemnation of his land either
paid to her directly or set aside for her benefit upon the contingency
of her surviving her husband.'1 The opinion contains a valuable
discussion of the nature and incidents of the inchoate right of dower
as adjudicated in the South Carolina cases.
8. Although unappealed from, it would seem that the decree in the first ac-
tion was correct in that an intention to incorporate the deeds by reference was
manifested and the identification of the deeds was sufficient. Cf. Lawrence v.
Burnett, 109 S.C. 416, 96 S.E. 144 (1918). Had the Court not found the deeds
to have been incorporated by reference it could be argued that the devise would
fail because of indefiniteness.
9. Sanderson v. Bigham, 40 S.C. 501, 19 S.E. 71 (1894).
10. 225 S.C. 502, 83 S.E. 2d 176 (1954).
11. See notes 5 A.L.R. 1347 (1920) ; 101 A.L.R. 697 (1936).
[Vol. 8
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Fixtures
In Carrol v. Britt12 a wife had placed on a farm of her husband
three buildings (a combination residence and store, a pack house, and
a wash house) owned by her. Together with her husband and
their two minor daughters she lived on the farm and utilized the
buildings for some two years, after which she separated from her
husband and moved off the land, taking the children with her. About
two years after the separation she obtained a divorce from her hus-
band. Shortly thereafter he died intestate, leaving the two daughters
as his sole heirs, whereupon the ex-wife resumed her occupancy of
the land. Apparently in the belief that she was an heir of the de-
cedent, she gave a mortgage of her "interest" in the land. In an
action brought to approve a partition settlement between the daugh-
ters, and to exclude any claims of the ex-wife and her mortgagee
(who defaulted), she answered, alleging her ownership of the build-
ings by reason of an agreement between her and her husband that
the buildings were to remain her personal property after installation
on the land.
The Master ruled that the buildings in question were of the kind
which customarily are installed for the permanent enhancement of
the value of land. Also, that the wife was not a tenant of the hus-
band, and the installations were not to be treated as trade fixtures.
Since the Master found insufficient evidence of the alleged agreement
that the buildings were to remain the personal property of the wife,
he concluded that they had become fixtures to the land, and, there-
fore, that the ex-wife no longer had an interest therein. The circuit
judge disagreed with the Master and concluded that the evidence
sufficiently established the existence of the alleged agreement. On
appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit decree and
affirmed the report of the Master.
Partition
Turner v. Byars13 was a suit to partition a lot of land among the
respondents, the heirs of the deceased owner. The appellant, a third
person in possession, was made a party defendant, the complaint
alleging that he "now occupies the house on the above described land
and makes some claim thereto." The appellant answered, setting
up that he was in possession under an installment contract to purchase
made by him with an agent of the respondents, and further alleging
payments pursuant to the contract and valuable improvements made
12. 86 S.E. 2d 612 (S.C. 1955).
13. 85 S.E. 2d 100 (S.C. 1954).
1955]
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by him. Specific performance of the contract was demanded, or,
if that could not be had, that he be reimbursed for his payments and
the value of the improvements.
On motion of the respondents the circuit judge required appellant
to deposit monthly sums for the privilege of continued occupancy of
the premises, funds so deposited to be applied on the purchase price
should appellant succeed in establishing the contract, otherwise to be
applied as rent; that should appellant fail to make the payments, re-
spondents might apply for an order of ejectment. Further, the cir-
cuit judge, on his own motion, referred the matter to the Master-
Thereafter appellant failed to make the required payments, and the
Sheriff was directed to eject him.
On appeal the Supreme Court held invalid the order requiring ap-
pellant to make monthly payments, and providing for his ejectment
in the event of nonpayment. Such action was tantamount to the ap-
pointment of a receiver, said the court, and while under some circum-
stances such appointment in a partition action is proper, it should not
be done when, as here, though nominally for partition, the action in.
fact is against an occupant in undisturbed possession under claim of
equitable title. The court further found an insufficient showing to
authorize such order had been made. There was no allegation that
appellant was in unlawful possession, or that he was insolvent or
committing waste. The pleadings were unverified, and respondents,
offered no affidavits to contradict the allegations of appellant's ans-
wer.
However, despite appellant's claim that he was entitled to a jury
trial, the case was held properly to have been referred to the Master.
The court said that the basic issue was not as to the legal title, which
admittedly was in respondents, but appellant's right to specific per-
formance of the alleged contract of purchase, relief which is equitable
in nature.
Wilson v. Cooper'4 reaffirmed' 5 the validity in South Carolina of
a parol partition of land, the court stating, "It is well settled in this
State that valid partition of lands may be made by parol where there is
sufficient part performance to take the transaction out of the Statute
of Frauds. And actual possession is deemed the most satisfactory
evidence of part performance."
The evidence disclosed that in 1913, pursuant to an oral agreement
for the partition of the land, the heirs of an intestate landowner had
the land surveyed and a plat prepared showing the agreed division,
14. 86 S.E. 2d 59 (S.C. 1955).
15. The court cites a number of earlier cases to the same effect.
[Vol. a
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and went into possession of their respective shares. This was held
sufficient evidence of the consummation of the partition agreement,
despite the fact that thereafter the property continued to be carried
on the tax books in the name of the estate of the ancestor, and that
later conveyances by certain of the heirs described the interests con-
veyed as undivided interests.
In Thompson v. McGill16 the court affirmed the circuit decree dis-
missing the complaint in a partition action in which certain defendants
set up sole title in themselves. The basis of plaintiffs' appeal was
that the referee had erred in permitting these defendants to introduce
in evidence the record of a certain deed despite plaintiffs' prior no-
tice that they would object to such introduction of the record on the
ground that the deed was a forgery, plaintiffs' contention being that
the service of such notice rendered the record of the deed inadmissible
under COD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 26-105, 26-106.1
7
The opinion of the court bases the affirmance on deficiencies in the
record, which record the court found to disclose no interest of the
plaintiffs in the land. Three justices concurred in the result, one of
them in a separate opinion stating that the record of the deed was
properly admitted under the common law rules of evidence for proof
of lost papers in accordance with COe oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952 § 26-805,18 and that §§ 26-105 and 26-106 were inapplicable.
16. 85 S.E. 2d 867 (S.C. 1955).
17. CODe OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 26-105:
"Production of instruments required to be recorded evidence of execution
and recording.
The production, without further or other proof, of the original of any in-
strument in writing (other than a will) required by law to be recorded shall
be prima facie evidence of the execution and recording of such instrument
if such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner and place and
within the time prescribed by law for recording the same and the record-
ing thereof shall have been certified by the clerk of court or register of
mesne conveyances and if the party or his attorney so producing any such
recorded instrument shall have given at least ten days' previous notice in
writing to the opposite party or his attorney of his intention so to produce
any such recorded instrument with a description of the same."
§ 26-106. "Section 26-105 not applicable when fraud alleged.
The provisions of § 26-105 shall not apply when any such recorded instru-
ment is assailed or attacked on the ground of fraud in its execution if at
least ten days' previous notice in writing of such ground by a pleading or
otherwise duly sworn to shall have been given by the party or his attorney
so assailing or attacking such instrument to the opposite party or his at-
torneys."
18. CoDR OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
§ 26-805. "Other proof of lost papers.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent anyone from establishing on the
trial of any cause any lost papers, according to the rules of evidence exist-
ing at common law."
19551
7
Means: Real and Personal Property
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTZR[LY
Rescission
In Owens v. Sweat,19 a suit to rescind an exchange of real estate,
the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit judge (who had reversed
the Master) that the plaintiff had made a showing sufficient to warrant
such relief. Rescission was sought on the ground of fraud, inade-
quate consideration, mental incapacity, and undue influence, and the
defendant's answer was, in effect, a general denial and a plea of the
statute of frauds with respect to any agreement to recovery.
The evidence was to the effect that the plaintiff, an illiterate farm-
er over 60 years of age whose mental abilities had been lessened by
a paralytic stroke, had conveyed his farm (worth ten to twelve thou-
sand dollars or more) to defendant, a younger and more experienced
man and a trusted friend, for a recited consideration of seven thousand
dollars, accepting in exchange therefor a conveyance to his wife of
a house and lot worth four thousand dollars, and defendant's mort-
gage, also to his wife, on the farm in the sum of three thousand dol-
lars. The testimony further established that the plaintiff's apparent
purpose in the transaction was to clear his property of any dower
claim in a former wife,2 0 and that the conveyance had been made upon
defendant's promise to reconvey if requested to do so by plaintiff
within a specified period, which agreement defendant had repudiated
when plaintiff demanded a reconveyance.
Affirming the circuit decree, the court quoted therefrom the follow-
ing: "The inadequacy of consideration in conjunction with the men-
tal incapacity, undue influence and the fraud practiced by defendant,
requires the granting of the relief as asked by plaintiff."
Zoning
In Application of Groves2' the court again22 had occasion to con-
sider the always difficult question of the propriety of a grant by a
municipal board of adjustment of a variance from a zoning ordi-
nance as authorized under CODI op LAWS OV SOUTH CAROLINA,
19. 86 S.E. 2d 886 (S.C. 1955).
20. Apparently no contention was made that plaintiff's conveyance having
been made for the fraudulent purpose of depriving his first wife of her dower
interest, a court of equity should refuse relief. See All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C.
279, 307, 20 S.E. 2d 741 (1942). Even though it had been made however, it
appears that such contention would not have availed the defendant. See Lyon
v. Bargiol, 212 S.C. 266, 47 S.E. 2d 625 (1948).
21. 85 S.E. 2d 708 (S.C. 1955).
22. Prior cases are Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Board of Adjustment, 222 S.C.
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1952 § 47-1009 (3)2 .
The Charleston Board of Adjustment, over the objection of cer-
tain residents, authorized the construction of a "water front, sea-
food restaurant" on a lot in a residential district leased by the
applicant from the State Ports Authority. The objecting residents
brought certiorari, but the circuit court concurred in a finding by
a special referee that such variance should be permitted.
On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the action of the Board,
and reversed the order of the circuit court. The court said that a
restaurant, regardless of the type, is properly excluded from a resi-
dential area. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded,
"Not only is there no proof that the particular property under con-
sideration suffers a singular disadvantage from the operation of the
zoning ordinances, but on the contrary, it affirmatively appears that
any disadvantage to the same is suffered generally by the entire
area of which this is but a small part." The opinion then quotes
from Corpus Juris Secundum24 to the effect that unless the property
suffers some unusual hardship different from and greater than that
suffered by other property, a variance is not warranted. The court
further observed that at best the applicant had made out only a
doubtful case for variance, and quoted from an earlier case 25 as fol-
lows, "This [power to grant variance] is an exceptional power which
should be sparingly exercised and can be validly used only where a
situation falls fully within the specified conditions." (emphasis by
the court.)
Justice Oxner dissented from the judgment of the court. In his
opinion, "the proof shows that the property in question suffers a
singular disadvantage through the operation of the zoning regula-
tions. Indeed, the undisputed facts are to the effect that it can never
be used for residential purposes. The denial of a variance in this
case has the practical effect of confiscating the property of the State
Ports Authority."
23. CODS OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
§ 47-1009. "General powers of board.
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
(3) To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the
terms of any ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest when
owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of such
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship and so that the spirit of such
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done."
24. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 227 (11), p. 536.
25. Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 45 A. 2d 828, 829
(1946), quoted in Hodge v. Pollock, 223 S.C. 342, 349, 75 S.E. 2d 66 (1952).
19551
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Personal Property
Floyd v. Burden26 involves a claim and delivery action to recover
possession of certain pin tables which had been seized by the de-
fendant as chief of police, apparently in the mistaken belief that
they were illegal gambling devices. The testimony was that the
plaintiffs were the owners of the tables and had placed them in
business places owned by others under an agreement for the division
of money played into the tables, and that the tables were in the
possession of the owners or operators of the places of business where
they were seized. The trial judge granted plaintiffs' motion for
judgment, and the question on appeal was whether he should have
granted defendant's motion for directed verdict on the ground that
the plaintiffs had not showed themselves to be entitled to possession
of the tables.
Affirming judgment for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court said
that evidence of ownership of personal property raises a presump-
tion of the owner's right to possession. That not only was there
nothing in the testimony to rebut this presumption, but it was to be
inferred from the facts that the owners of the pin tables were entitled
to take possession at any time, the proprietors of the business places
being mere "local custodians". The court found inapplicable earlier
South Carolina cases2 7 involving unsuccessful suits against third
parties by bailors for a term brought during the period of the bail-
ment term.
In Stephcns v. Hendricks28 the court held the plea of bona fide
purchaser for value, without notice, under the bailment statute,
2 9
to be an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved by
the party thereon relying.
That the statutory lien3" upon a motor vehicle which has been
attached in an action for personal injury or property damage result-
ing from its wilful or negligent operation, survives the vehicle's
release from the attachment pursuant to the filing of a bond, was
decided in Stephenson Finance Co. v. Burgess.31 The bond which
had secured the vehicle's release having become worthless before the
injured party's subsequently obtained judgment had been satisfied,
the court held that the statutory lien was not discharged by the under-
26. 85 S.E. 2d 861 (S.C. 1955). A companion case is Riving v. Burden, 85
S.R. 2d 862 (S.C. 1955).
27. Steele v. Williams, Dudley 16 (S.C. 1837); Bell v. Monahan, Dudley 38
(S.C. 1837).
28. 83 S.E. 2d 634 (S.C. 1954).
29. Com op LAWS oP SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-308.
30. Covr or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 45-551.
31. 226 S.C. 79, 82 S.E. 2d 512 (1954)-
[Vol. 8
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taking in release of the attachment, and that the judgment creditor
might still proceed against the vehicle by execution and sale under
his statutory lien, and thus maintain priority over the holder of a
chattel mortgage on the vehicle.
Legislation
Four acts of the 1955 session of the General Assembly are worthy
of mention in this review of developments in the South Carolina
law of property.
By act8 2 approved 11 March 1955, it is provided that "[b] eginning
Dec. 7, 1941, any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the
United States or any officer of the United States Merchant Marine,
serving either within or without the limits of the United States, is
authorized to verify pleadings, probate deeds and mortgages, take
renunciations of dower, proofs of claims and to otherwise act in the
same capacity as a notary public. When acting as such the officer
shall sign his name, rank, serial number and organization and in
such cases no official seal shall be necessary."
By act33 approved 14 April 1955, it is provided that "[w] hen any
last will . . . is filed with the probate court having jurisdiction a
certified copy of same shall likewise be filed with the judge of probate
of every county of the state where the deceased owned real estate."
The act further provides "that the legal representative of the estate
shall not be discharged until showing is made ... that the provisions
of this section have been complied with."
By act 34 approved 11 March 1955, § 57-103, 35 providing that no
alien or corporation controlled by aliens shall own or control more
than five hundred acres of land within the State, was amended to
provide that in counties containing not less than twelve hundred
square miles such aliens or corporations may own or control not
more than six hundred and fifty acres of land.
By act 36 approved 29 April 1955, § 19-5237 was amended by the
addition of a new subsection providing, under certain circumstances,
that stepchildren shall inherit from the decedent. A full discussion
of this amendment will be found in Professor Karesh's Survey of
Wills.
32. 49 STAT. 88 (1955).
33. 49 STAT. 191 (1955).
34. 49 STAr. 98 (1955).
35. CODE Ov LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-103.
36. 49 SrAT. 309 (1955).
37. Coos OF LAWS oV SOUTH CAROLiNA, 1952 § 19-52.
1955]
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